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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the impact of European bank mergers on changes in key safety and soundness 
measures of both acquirers and targets. We find that acquirers in cross-border deals tend to 
perform better when their home country prudential supervisors and deposit insurance funding 
systems are stricter than that of the target. For target banks, we find that stronger supervision and 
tougher deposit insurance funding regimes result in positive post merger changes in liquidity and 
performance. Overall, while bank mergers have undermined bank safety and soundness in some 
cases, our evidence indicates that strong regulation and supervision can partly ameliorate this. 
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The Safety and Soundness Effects of Bank M&A in the EU:  
Does Prudential Regulation Have any Impact? 
 
1. Introduction: 
This paper examines post-merger changes in the balance sheets and operating performance of 
acquiring and target banks in the European Union before the start of the global financial crisis 
with an emphasis on the implications for bank safety and soundness.  The EU has a policy of 
encouraging cross-border mergers as a way of developing a single market for financial services 
with the adoption of the euro providing added emphasis on integrated financial markets in the 
eurozone.  Bank mergers, both within country and across Member States in the EU, may come 
with an added benefit in the form of safer banks as weaker banks are taken over and financially 
strengthened.  Additionally, bank mergers may result in stronger post-merger groups to the 
extent that the target imports the benefits from relatively stricter consolidated supervision.   
Alternatively, mergers could come with the cost of financially weaker acquirers and 
targets.  Banks could become weaker and more dependent upon the safety net if they are able to 
reduce the effectiveness of regulation either by exploiting new opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage between countries or by obtaining greater influence or clout over the prudential 
supervisors.  This could come about from a weakening of the target’s supervision due to its 
acquisition by a bank with greater influence over the supervisor or a weakening of the acquirer’s 
supervision (such as by making the bank too-big-to-fail) or both.1    
                                                
1 The phrase “too-big-to-fail” (or TBTF) was made famous after the collapse of Continental Illinois in 1984.  The 
phrase has come to be taken to refer any financial firm that government policymakers are likely to consider so 
important that they would not allow it to fail with losses to its creditors.  See O’Hara and Shaw (1990) for a 
discussion of the context of the original phrase.  
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Along with this study’s contribution to our understanding of bank consolidation in the 
EU, this paper also provides unique insights into the impact of bank supervision and deposit 
insurance funding systems on post-merger changes in banking organizations.  The existing 
literature on post-merger changes has focused on U.S. mergers.  The limitation of such a focus 
exclusively is that U.S. banks face a relatively homogenous set of prudential regulations and a 
common deposit insurance premium schedule.  In contrast banks in the EU can have 
substantially different regulatory and no common rules on setting deposit insurance premiums.   
 Our analysis focuses on three variables of interest to prudential supervisors:  (1) 
capitalization as proxied by the equity capital to total assets ratio, (2) performance as proxied by 
return on assets (ROA), and (3) liquidity as proxied by the funding ratio (the ratio of liquid assets 
to the sum of customer deposits and short-term funding).  Bank capitalization has long been the 
focus of prudential supervisors as banks with more capital have a greater solvency buffer for 
dealing with unfavorable shocks to asset values and have easier access to liquidity in the 
markets.  Higher performance similarly creates a larger buffer providing greater ability to absorb 
adverse shocks to asset values and greater ability to rebound as conditions improve.  Liquidity 
also provides a buffer from unfavorable shocks but in the form of time rather than loss 
absorption.  If a bank absorbs an adverse shock with low liquidity buffers, it may come under 
considerable stress to obtain liquidity in the market in the short term, whereas banks with large 
liquidity buffers will have time to demonstrate their underlying solvency to the market.  
Moreover, even if a bank is insolvent after an adverse shock, the supervisors will likely have 
more time to respond to the insolvency if the bank is more liquid.  Changes in all three variables 
should be of interest to supervisors regardless of whether the changes were caused by the merger 
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or the merger merely facilitated changes that the acquirer’s management already wanted to 
implement. 
 It should be highlighted that our empirical analysis explores post-merger changes both in 
the acquirer and the target from one year prior to two years after completion of a merger.   That 
is, we attempt to fully isolate the short-term impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on 
variables of special interest to prudential supervisors taking into consideration the stringency of 
their prudential regulation and safety net support via deposit insurance.2  Although additional 
changes may occur after our two year window, we use a two year window in part to reduce the 
impact of confounding events on our measures and also to reduce the number of banks that drop 
out of our sample due to missing data. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The literature review is in the next 
section.  The third section develops a multivariate model, while the fourth section reviews the 
data and provides univariate statistics.  The fifth section presents our model results, while 
concluding remarks and policy implications are provided in the final section.   
2. Literature review 
 There is a substantial literature on bank mergers, with Berger, Demsetz and Strahan 
(1999) referencing 250 papers in their survey on bank consolidation and DeYoung, Evanoff and 
Molyneux (2009) referencing another 150 papers in their survey of the post-2000 literature.3  
Most of the studies referenced in these two papers focus on the large literature analyzing U.S. 
                                                
2 Note that we use the terms regulation / supervision interchangeably for the purpose of this paper. 
3 See also Rhoades (1994), Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo (2004), and Jones and Critchfield (2005) for surveys of 
the bank merger literature. 
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takeovers, but both papers also include some discussion of the smaller literature on bank 
consolidation in Europe.  However, only a fraction of these studies overlap with the issues 
addressed in this paper and we are not aware of any recent study that examines the post-merger 
changes in safety and soundness measures commonly used by EU supervisors.  The following 
subsections review those portions of the literature most relevant to our analysis.    
2.1  Bank M&A studies that do not take into consideration the impact of regulation  
 The first step in the merger process is that of determining whether the bank is going to 
participate in a merger and, if so, whether as an acquirer or target.  The part of the Berger, 
Demsetz and Strahan survey that addresses this issue focuses on the relative efficiency of the two 
parties before the takeover.  Their summary suggests that more efficient acquirers tend to buy 
less efficient targets in the U.S. and Europe.  More recently Hannon and Pilloff (2009) find that 
acquirers tend to purchase less profitable targets in the U.S.4  Most specifications in Hernando, 
Nieto and Wall’s (2009) analysis of bank takeovers in Europe and find a significant positive 
coefficient on the cost to income ratio of the target but an insignificant coefficient on the return 
on average assets.   
 Along with the determination of which institutions are acquired, the literature has also 
examined the prices paid for bank acquisition targets.  The issue addressed by this literature that 
is most relevant to this paper is whether the prices paid are consistent with acquirers seeking to 
reduce their exposure to supervisory discipline and possibly increase their risk profile. Benston, 
                                                
4 Hannon and Pilloff (2009) also find evidence that banks with lower capital to asset ratios are more likely to be 
acquired.  However, this finding does not necessarily have any implications for post-merger changes in capital under 
their preferred explanation. 
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Hunter and Wall (1995) examine bank merger premiums paid and fail to find evidence that 
acquirers purchase more risky banks.  Several recent studies suggest, however, that banks seek to 
reduce their regulatory burden.  Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) find evidence that banking 
organizations will pay a premium to targets in order to grow above the thresholds associated with 
being ‘too-big-to-fail’.  Two recent studies of European mergers also find evidence of regulatory 
avoidance and acquirers seeking to become too-big-to-fail.  Molyneux, Schaeck, and Zhou 
(2010) find that listed bank merger premiums paid are positively correlated with the relative size 
of the two banks, which is a rough proxy for the extent to which the merger is likely to increase 
the probability that the bank would receive government support if it becomes distressed.  They 
further find that banks that paid more for past acquisitions are more likely to be perceived ex 
ante and treated ex post as too systemically important to fail.5  Hagendorff, Hernando, Nieto and 
Wall (2011) find that the premiums paid in European mergers are significantly lower in countries 
with stricter regulatory and stronger deposit insurance regimes.  However, when takeovers are 
separated into domestic and cross-border takeovers, the impact of regulatory and deposit 
insurance regimes is only significant for domestic mergers.  Unlike Molyneux, Schaeck, and 
Zhou (2010), they reject the hypothesis that the premium is influenced by the relative size of the 
banks.   
A third type of evidence comes from studies of changes in shareholder wealth of publicly 
traded participants in bank takeovers. In terms of overall results, DeYoung, Evanoff, and 
Molyneux (2009) find a divergence between the studies in the 1980s and 1990s versus those in 
                                                
5The direction of causality in this finding, however, is not clear.  It may be that banks which are large enough to be 
considered systemically important pay more for acquisitions while banks that overpay for their acquisitions are more 
likely to need assistance after the merger  
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the 2000s.  The earlier literature typically found that targets obtain positive abnormal returns, 
acquirers earned small negative returns and the combined returns were statistically insignificant 
or economically small.  More recently, only European bank deals have increased shareholder 
value (Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey, 2008).  Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg (2004) find 
that for their sample of European takeovers the coefficient on the relative cost-to–assets ratio is 
significant for targets but not for bidder returns or combined returns.  They fail to find a 
significant relationship between shareholder returns and pre-merger profitability.  Campa and 
Hernado (2006) find that relatively smaller targets have higher announcement returns for a 
sample of bank and non-bank financial takeovers in Europe. Beccalli and Frantz (2009) show 
that bank M&As cause a slight deterioration in return on equity, cash flow return and profit 
efficiency. Ekkayokkaya, Holmes and Paudyal (2009) differentiate between M&As in the pre-
euro era, the run-up to the euro and the post-euro period.  In the pre-euro era, bidders were 
making significant gains on average, although there were differences between domestic 
acquisitions (which were zero NPV transactions) and foreign acquisitions (which were value 
enhancing).   In contrast, in the run up to and post euro periods, bids add no value to shareholder 
wealth irrespective of whether the deal was domestic or cross-border.  Craninckx and 
Huyghebaert (2011) test the relation between short-term abnormal returns at deal announcement 
and M&A failure.  Their results indicate M&A failure rates of up to 50%.  When acquirers and 
targets are listed, lower M&A announcement returns are consistently and significantly associated 
with higher M&A failure probabilities and long term value losses. 
 Some studies have also examined post-merger changes in the target or acquirer or both.  
Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) review studies of post-merger profitability (ROA and 
ROE) and the findings of studies using production functions for estimates of post-merger 
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changes x-efficiency.6  The post-merger profitability studies tended to be split between improved 
profitability and no change in profitability.  Their survey also concludes that the results of 
analyzing changes in cost x-efficiency concur with simpler ratio-based cost studies that bank 
mergers produce little or nothing in terms of cost reductions—albeit there was some evidence of 
improvement if the participants were less efficient than their peers.  Vander Vennet (2002) 
analyzes changes in cost and profit efficiency for a sample of European cross-border mergers.  
He finds evidence of an increase in profit efficiency but not in cost efficiency.7  Hagendorff and 
Keasey (2009) find evidence of lower cost ratios post-merger in their sample of European banks 
with accompanying reductions in lending activity. 
 Another issue explored by the literature is the role of the extent of similarity (or 
relatedness) of the pre-merger target and the acquirer on various aspects of bank takeovers.  
Many studies incorporate one aspect of pre-merger similarity into the analysis, such as measures 
of relative size or efficiency.  Surveys of this literature by Altunbaş and Marqués (2008) and 
DeYoung, Evanoff and Molyneux (2009) find that mergers that increased product line focus 
produced higher abnormal returns.  Additionally, Altunbaş and Marqués (2008) provide new 
evidence that focusing mergers resulted in better performance for domestic takeovers but that the 
nature of the strategic aspect was important for cross-border mergers.  For example, they find 
                                                
6  The use of production functions from the industrial organization literature is possible for banking firms because 
banks produce generally similar outputs using similar inputs.  The older studies in this literature focused on 
economies of scale and scope in production costs.  Over the last couple of decades, the banking literature has 
expanded to consider revenues jointly with costs (or profitability) and the extent to which a bank is operating below 
the production possibility curve (x-efficiency or sometimes simply efficiency). 
7 However, Vander Vennet (2002) also notes that there may be various short-run barriers to improving cost 
efficiency for European takeovers. 
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that differences in their premerger credit risk strategies were associated with higher performance 
whereas greater differences in cost structure were associated with lower performance.   
 Thus, the issues of post-merger changes in profitability and capital have been touched 
upon in the literature using a variety of different approaches.  The evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that bank mergers lead to higher profitability post-merger is weak at best.  There also 
is some evidence that bank mergers are used as a tool to become larger, perhaps with the goal of 
becoming too-big-to-fail.  This study analyzes the immediate post-merger changes in three 
variables of special interest to supervisors (solvency, liquidity and profitability) while controlling 
for the stringency of national prudential regulatory frameworks as well as explicit safety net 
support in the form of deposit insurance. 
2.2  Bank M&A studies that take into consideration the impact of regulation and the 
possibility of regulatory arbitrage 
 
 Several recent studies suggest that banks engage in M&A to reduce their regulatory 
burden.  Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) find evidence that banking organizations will pay a 
premium to targets in order to grow above the thresholds associated with being ‘too-big-to-fail’.  
Two recent studies of European mergers also find evidence of regulatory avoidance and 
acquirers seeking to become too-big-to-fail.  Molyneux, Schaeck, and Zhou (2010) find that 
listed bank merger premiums paid are positively correlated with the relative size of the two 
banks, which is a rough proxy for the extent to which the merger is likely to increase the 
probability that the bank would receive government support if it becomes distressed.  They 
further find that banks that paid more for past acquisitions are more likely to be perceived ex 
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ante and treated ex post as too systemically important to fail.8  Hagendorff, Hernando, Nieto and 
Wall (2011) find that the premiums paid in European mergers are significantly lower in countries 
with stricter regulatory and stronger deposit insurance regimes.  However, when takeovers are 
separated into domestic and cross-border takeovers, the impact of regulatory and deposit 
insurance regimes is only significant for domestic mergers.  Unlike Molyneux et al. (2010), 
Hagendorff et al. (2011) reject the hypothesis that the premium is influenced by the relative size 
of the banks. 
Carbo-Valverde, Kane and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2012) focus on changes in the 
estimated fair values of deposit insurance for banks that do and do not engage in cross-border 
mergers.  While Carbo-Valverde et al.’s (2012) measure of deposit insurance value is very 
comprehensive, it relies on the availability of market data which limits the sample to publicly 
traded banks. Carbo-Valverde et al. (2008) find that banks which had engaged in cross-border 
M&A activities extract higher safety net subsidies and that these banks did not become more 
efficient.   Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that banks are using mergers to more 
effectively exploit the safety net.	  	   
In sum, while there are many papers that touch on issues related to our paper, these 
papers do not explicitly address post-merger changes in safety and soundness against the 
background of national policy stances on prudential regulation and deposit insurance.  The paper 
most similar to our paper in terms of its focus on post-merger changes in the safety net is Carbo-
Valverde, Kane and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2012) that uses a different methodology and 
                                                
8The direction of causality in this finding, however, is not clear.  It may be that banks which are large enough to be 
considered systemically important pay more for acquisitions while banks that overpay for their acquisitions are more 
likely to need assistance after the merger  
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addresses a slightly different set of questions.  Their methodology uses market prices which 
avoids some of the problems inherent in the use of accounting data such as capital and earnings 
management.9  However, reliance on market data also precludes analysis of post-takeover 
changes at targets and also precludes analysis of non-public acquirers.  Our ability to include 
non-public acquirers is especially valuable given that non-public banks play important roles in 
the banking sectors of many European countries.  Moreover, an understanding of how 
accounting values change is important in its own right as  bank supervisors rely primarily on 
accounting values (in part because these values are available for all of the banks they supervise). 
3. Model 
 To analyze the factors that determine changes in solvency, liquidity and profitability on 
acquirer and target banks in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following model using OLS 
regressions with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Post-mrgr changei,j = α + β1 controlj +  β2 relatednessj + β3 regulatoryj + εi,j ,   (1) 
where 
 Post-mrgr changei,j    = changes in i for bank j between years -1 to +2 relative to the 
merger completion year.  Financial variables are measured 
separately for the target and for the acquirer. For targets, we 
compare unconsolidated bank data before and after a deal. For 
acquiring banks, we compare pre-merger values for the acquirer 
with post-merger data for the consolidated banking group. 
                                                
9 The impact of capital and earnings management is mitigated by our focus on changes (rather than levels) in 
accounting values from before the merger until two years after the merger.  To the extent that the banks are 
following consistent strategies for managing reported capital and earnings, our focus on changes provides an 
automatic adjustment for cross-sectional differences in management strategies. 
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 controlj   = vector of control variables for firm type j, 
 relatednessj  = vector of relatedness variables for firm type j, 
 regulatoryj   = vector of regulatory variables for firm type j, 
i  = set of dependent variables which are capitalization (capasset 
which is the equity-to-assets ratio), performance (ROA = return on 
assets), and liquidity (liquid =  liquid assets [trading assets and 
loans with less than three months to maturity] scaled by customer 
funding and funding with a maturity of less than three months. 
Merger-related changes between years -1 and +2 are denoted by 
the prefix d (dcapasset, dROA, and dliquid), 
 j    = firm type equal to target or acquirer, 
 β1 , β2, β3   = vectors of coefficient values, and 
 εi,j    = random heteroscedasticity-robust error 
 
A reasonable assumption is that the acquirer made changes in the target after obtaining 
control rights.  Thus, as a first approximation most of the coefficients in the target and acquirer 
equation are assumed to reflect the managerial decisions of the acquirer.  The supervisory 
implication is that the observed changes in the target and acquirer’s operations would not have 
happened if the merger had not occurred.   
However, a common limitation of all studies of acquirer’s post-merger performance is 
that there are three reasonable, not mutually exclusive, hypotheses. Merger-related changes in 
the acquirer may be due to:  (1) the simple consolidation effect of adding the target’s income and 
balance sheet values to the acquirer; (2) the effect of any managerial changes the acquirer made 
on the target, and (3) the acquirer’s strategy which may dictate both changes in its own 
operations and the type of target acquired by the bank.  The first two possibilities would suggest 
that the merger caused the observed change in the acquirer with the implication that the changes 
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would not have happened if the supervisors had blocked the merger for some reason.  The third 
hypothesis, however, would suggest that the acquirer would likely have made the operational 
changes regardless of whether it acquired the target.  We cannot distinguish among these three 
hypotheses in our empirical analysis. 
 The explanatory variables fall into three general categories:  control variables, merger 
partner relatedness variables and variables directly related to regulatory concerns. 
3.1 Control variables 
 If our dependent variables are subject to random shocks, part of their adjustment over our 
three-year window may merely be movement towards their mean value.  If so, changes in the 
dependent variable over a given time period should be negatively related to their values in the 
first year (t-1).  For example, if earnings changes are measured from t -1 to t +2, these changes 
should be negatively related to the level of earnings in t-1 as the shocks return to their mean 
value of zero.  Building on Fama and French (2000), Knapp, Gart and Chaudhry (2006) estimate 
models of changes in industry-adjusted ROA and ROE for banks and consistently find a 
significant negative coefficient on their base year value. 
 Bank managers may also make non-random changes in capital, liquidity and earnings that 
induce a negative correlation similar to that observed by Knapp, Gart and Chaudhry (2006).  
Prior to the merger, the participants may manage their premerger accounting earnings with a goal 
of improving their negotiating position in takeover talks.  Also, the acquirer may temporarily 
boost its premerger capital and liquidity ratios in order to enhance its ability to obtain 
supervisory approval for the takeover.  Non-random post-merger changes in target capital may 
occur to the extent that the target’s supervisor required the acquirer to inject additional capital 
into the target as a condition for approving the takeover. Altunbas and Marqués (2004) also find 
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a significant negative coefficient on the one-year lagged performance variable for a sample of 
EU bank mergers.  Thus, each equation includes the level of the variable being analyzed as of t-
1.  For example, in the equation estimating merger-related changes in capitalization (dcapasset), 
the target capital ratio at t-1 is included (levert-1).  The coefficient on this variable is expected to 
have a negative sign.  Coefficients between zero and -1 could merely be due to mean reversion in 
balance sheet items.  However, coefficients with values less than -1 would be suggestive of 
deliberative effort by the banks to boost their reported premerger capital, liquidity and/or 
earnings.   
 A second control variable is toe which is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
acquirer owned shares in the target prior to the acquisition (that is, the acquirer already has a “toe 
hold”).  If the acquirer already has an ownership interest in the target, it is possible that the target 
has already started to make some of the changes that would be desired by the acquirer.  Thus, the 
expected sign on this variable is negative.  Moreover, the impact of toe is likely to be more 
significant on the target’s operations than on the consolidated results as prior ownership interest 
is likely to have little impact on the acquirer’s operations pre-merger.  
Another control variable is a measure of competition in the market proxied by an asset-
based Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration which we compute at country 
level (using all banks listed on Bankscope).  The structure-conduct-performance paradigm holds 
that there is less competition and hence higher potential profits in more concentrated markets.  
The direct effect of the acquisition may be to further increase concentration and thereby increase 
profitability, especially in domestic takeovers.  However, there are at least two hypotheses that 
suggest a negative correlation.  First, it is also possible that the takeover will result in 
management changes that at least temporarily reduce the target’s ability to exploit the benefits of 
14 
market concentration.  Second, the acquirer may seek temporarily faster growth on the part of 
targets in more concentrated markets which may also depress profitability.  Thus, the 
implications for the coefficient on ROA are ambiguous.  Any changes in ROA could feed through 
to retained earnings and capitalization, producing a positive or negative association between HHI 
and capasset.  HHI is also included in the liquid equation for completeness. 
Finally, we include GDP growth during the year of the merger (gdpgrwth).  Banks 
operating in faster growing economies may make larger adjustments than banks in slower 
growing economies.  The expected sign on this variable is ambiguous.  Banks in faster growing 
economies should have a higher net income in the future and possibly in the short run.  Thus, it is 
possible that these banks will report higher levels of capasset due to higher retained earnings; 
higher ROA due to more business opportunities, and lower liquid due to excess lending 
opportunities over typical retail funding sources.  However, banks in faster growing markets may 
choose to forgo some current profits to invest in growth.  The result could be that the banks 
would report lower changes in capasset and ROA since profitability and retained earnings are 
being sacrificed in the short-run in favor of market share.  In this case, we can expect higher 
liquid assets over typical customer and short term funding (liquid).10  
   
                                                
10 This paper does not include the medium of payment in acquisitions (equity, cash, combination finance), because 
the available information is very limited in quantity and quality. Thomson Financial provides data on merger finance 
for less than half of sample deals. Means of payment data are mostly missing for acquisitions of non-listed targets 
and cannot be satisfactorily recovered from the news coverage surrounding a deal. 
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3.2 Relatedness variables 
 Acquirers buy targets for a variety of reasons including a desire to expand into different 
geographic and different product markets.  However, in many cases the acquirer may also 
believe that it has a superior business model to the target and plans implementing its model once 
the acquisition is complete.  The adoption of the acquirer’s model is likely to make the target’s 
balance sheet look more like that of the acquirer.  If the acquirer has a superior model, the 
target’s earnings performance should also move towards that of the acquirer.  Thus, our analysis 
also controls for the relatedness defined for financial variable i as acquirer’s value of i at t -1 
minus the target’s value of i at t -1. This variable is expected to have a value between zero and 
one. The extent of changes made by the target as it moves toward the acquirer’s business model 
post-merger may depend in part on the existence of a prior relationship between the two firms.  If 
the acquirer already had a toehold and used its ownership position to encourage changes in the 
target, the desired post merger changes in the target may be smaller.  For example, if as a result 
of the acquirer’s toehold position, the target has already started to reduce its liquidity towards the 
acquirer’s level, the remaining adjustment in the target’s capital should be smaller. Thus, the 
interaction of toe and the relatedness variable should have a negative coefficient.  
    
3.3 Regulatory variables 
One version of the safety net exploitation hypothesis is that cross-border mergers per se 
give rise to regulatory arbitrage opportunities.  If so, cross-border deals where the bidder and 
target bank are chartered in separate countries (cb) should be associated with the target bank and 
consolidated acquirer exhibiting higher returns, but also higher risk portfolios, implying a 
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positive coefficient in the roa equation.11  Safety net arbitrage may also lead to lower capital and 
liquidity, implying a negative coefficient in the dcapasset and dliqu regressions.  Two other 
possibilities are that: (a) cross-border deals are no different from domestic takeovers implying 
insignificant coefficients on cb in all three sets of regressions and (b) cross-border deals are more 
difficult to execute than domestic deals implying a negative coefficient in the roa equation and 
possibly also negative coefficients in the dcapasset and dliqu regressions. 
All else equal, prudential supervisors prefer high capital, earnings and liquidity to reduce 
the risk that a bank could become insolvent or illiquid.  The proxy for the prudential supervisors’ 
ability to enforce their preferences on the bank is regul_strength.  Thus, dcapasset and dliqu are 
expected to be positively correlated with regul_strength. The expected sign on droa is 
ambiguous.  While supervisors may prefer higher profits, stricter regulation imposes compliance 
costs that may result in lower bank profits.  As a possible offset, underperforming but viable 
targets would face greater supervisory pressure to sell themselves to sound and better performing 
acquirers in countries with stricter regulation.   Such supervisory pressure would result in a 
positive correlation between the target’s droa and regul_ strength.  Following Buch and Delong 
(2008) and Hagendorff et al. (2011), we compile an index of regulatory and supervisory strength 
based on the Barth et al. (2001) database on global banking supervision. The variable 
                                                
11 The positive relationship would be expected to hold for an infinitely large sample.  However, for any finite sample 
it is possible that the coefficient will be negative if the realized draws are from the lower part of the return 
distribution. 
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regul_strength is an index that reflects the adoption of twelve supervisory powers by national 
authorities and varies between 0 and 12 with higher values indicating stricter regimes.12 
We compile an index of deposit insurance (di) that reflects the way in which the banks 
pay for their coverage based on data from the European Commission Joint Research Center 
(2008).  The index reflects if (i) insurance premiums are risk-based, and (ii) the deposit 
guarantee scheme is pre-funded. The index varies between 0 and 2. Higher values of di imply 
that the banks in that country bear a larger fraction of their losses. Hence, higher values of di 
could be associated with the combined banking organization seeking to reduce its reliance on the 
national deposit insurance scheme.  This implies a negative relationship between dliqu and di 
because high values of di would be associated with higher marginal cost of deposits of customers 
(premiums).  In turn, a higher premium for more risky banks, however, would imply a positive 
relationship between dcapasset and di explained by the incentives to keep higher capital ratios. 
If the takeover is across national boundaries, the acquirer’s consolidated group will have 
more options for reducing regulatory and deposit insurance burdens after the merger via 
regulatory arbitrage.  We model this effect by interacting the binary variable cb with both the 
                                                
12 The index values are based on answers (‘yes’=1) to the following provisions: banks disclose risk management 
procedures; risk-weights are in line with Basle guidelines; the capital–asset ratio varies with credit risk; the capital–
asset ratio varies with market risk; there is a formal definition of ‘non-performing loan’ (these components are 
related to prudential regulatory strength); there are automatic mechanisms to sanction directors and managers; the 
supervisory agency can order directors/management to make provisions to cover losses; the supervisory agency can 
suspend the distribution of dividends, bonuses, or management fees; the latter has been enforced in the past five 
years; the supervisory agency can declare a bank insolvent; the agency can suspend ownership rights of a problem 
bank; the supervisory agency (or any other government agency) can take measures aimed at bank restructuring and 
reorganization (these components are related  to the enforcement powers of supervisors). 
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difference in regul_strength between the acquirer and target (cb*regul) and the difference in di 
between the acquirer and the target (cb*di).  Thus, higher values of these interaction variables 
suggest that the prudential regulatory and deposit insurance environments are stricter in the 
acquirer’s home country. To the extent the acquirer engages in regulatory arbitrage by shifting 
the riskier and more profitable operations to the more lightly regulated target country, this shift 
would lead to an increase in the ROA of the target.  Thus, regulatory arbitrage implies a positive 
relationship between droa and the variables cb*regul and cb*di in the target regression models.   
Also, the shift of riskier operations to the target could result in a negative relationship 
between the target’s dliquid and the variables cb*regul and cb*di to the extent that the target 
reduces liquid assets in favor of riskier and less liquid assets. However, the stricter home country 
regulator may also use its influence, via the acquirer, in order to strengthen its capitalization and 
liquidity.  Hence, dcapasset and dliquid will have a positive correlation with cb*regul and cb*di.  
To the extent that supervisors make their prudential assessments on a consolidated basis, the 
room for possible regulatory arbitrage and exploitation of host countries safety nets is reduced.  
Hence, either no statistically significant or significant and positive relationships are expected 
between the acquirer´s dlever, and dliqu and the regulatory interaction terms cb*regul and cb*di.  
The impact on dROA is more uncertain.  A positive relationship would be explained either by the 
shifting of riskier and more profitable operations to the less regulated host country or by the 
benefits associated with the entrance in the host countries of franchises coming from stricter 
regulatory environments. A negative relationship between the acquirer´s dROA and the 
regulatory interaction terms cb*regul and cb*di could be explained by overall negative impact of 
higher regulatory costs.  
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 The variable relsize measures the size of target relative to the acquiring bank.  A low 
value of relsize indicates the target is joining a much larger acquirer which could influence 
market and supervisory evaluations.  Markets may perceive that a larger acquirer is better able to 
come to the aid of a smaller target.  If so, this perception would likely reduce the market pressure 
for higher capital and, all else equal, the cost of obtaining funding.  However, the acquisition by 
a larger acquirer could influence supervisors in two ways.  First, to the extent that supervisors 
consider potential support from the group, a lower value for relsize implies the bank is likely to 
benefit from that support (strength of group hypothesis).  A second influence on supervisory 
judgment is that a larger acquirer (smaller relsize) may have more influence with the supervisors 
to relax binding regulatory requirements on the target´s capitalization and possibly liquidity 
standards (regulatory clout hypothesis) or the consolidated group may possibly exploit further 
the safety net for being considered “too-big-to-fail.”  The market valuing implicit support and the 
regulatory clout hypothesis have similar implications for our model.  The coefficients on relsize 
are predicted to be positive in the droa, and negative in the dlever and possibly dliquid equations.  
The reverse holds for the acquirer, the larger relsize.  The acquirer may gain some diversification 
benefit from a larger target and/or acquiring a larger target may give it more clout with its 
supervisor and greater government implicit support in a crisis (consistent with Carbo et al.).  
Thus, the predicted relationship for the acquirer is that of a negative correlation between 
dcapassets and dliquid with relsize.  Similarly, a positive relationship for the acquirer would be 
expected between droa and relsize to the extent that the acquirer benefits from increased 
diverisification and/or an increase in perceived government implicit support.  
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4. Data and univariate analysis  
Our analysis focuses on accounting data.  We analyze changes in both targets and acquirers 
after mergers.  We also include both publicly traded and non-publicly traded banks. 
4.1  The sample 
We obtain the sample of European bank mergers (EU) from Thomson Financial’s M&A 
database.  Deals are announced and completed between 1997 (year before the launching of the 
Euro) and 2007 (year before the Lehman collapse) and involve commercial banks, mortgage and 
real estate banks, medium- and long-term credit banks, and bank holding companies which are 
chartered in Europe (EU).  We impose the following additional sampling criteria.  The acquirer 
purchases at least 1% of the target’s equity and all deals lead to the acquirer owning in excess of 
20% of the target bank’s equity.13  Sample banks are not subsidiaries of financial institutions 
chartered outside the EU.  We eliminate share repurchases from our sample. 
Target and acquiring banks accounting data are obtained from Fitch IBCA’s Bankscope 
database.  We ensured that accounting data are consistently reported in either International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or local accounting principles for every deal.14 Bankscope 
                                                
13 A control threshold of less than 50% is consistent with both accounting and supervisory rules in the EU. Thus, 
IFRS accounting rules consider ownership of 20% as a permanent investment and EU prudential supervisors have 
set a 20% ownership level as a threshold beyond which supervisory authorization is required (see Directive 2007 / 
44/ CE of the European Parliament).  
14 IFRS have been introduced after 2004 and apply only to listed banks in our sample.  IFRS introduced the fair 
value treatment of a larger variety of bank assets.  Hence, combing different accounting standards for one bank may 
cause severe measurement errors.  For example, Barclays experienced a year-on-year increase in the value of total 
assets of 30% following the adoption of IFRS. 
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does not allow us to determine whether and to what extent the target income statement and 
balance sheet are consolidated with the acquirer, excepting in those cases where the target 
charter is merged into the acquirer.15  However, given that our goal is to provide information on 
changes in the variables of interest to supervisors, the use of consolidated data is appropriate as 
these are the data that would be of most interest for prudential supervision.  
From an initial sample of 388 deals, we then omit deals where acquirers had a majority 
shareholding in the target bank before the merger was announced (defined as acquirers owning 
more than 50%). A majority ownership in the target means that bidding banks would have 
                                                
15 Acquirers may account for their stock holdings in the target in one of three ways:  using standard investment 
method for portfolio holdings (such as an available for sale (AFS) security) using the equity method, or 
consolidating the target with the acquirer.  The equity method is required when the acquirer exerts significant 
influence over the target, with 20 percent or more creating a presumption of influence.  The target must be 
consolidated if the acquirer controls the target, with the acquirer presumed to have control if it owns 50 percent or 
more.  We can observe ownership interest using Bankscope.  However, an acquirer may be deemed to exercise 
influence with less than 20 percent or to exercise control with less than 50 percent.  Thus, we cannot be certain about 
how the acquirer is accounting for the target.   
 Under both AFS and the equity method, the acquirer only recognizes the value of its investment in the 
target on its balance sheet.  Dividend payments are recognized in ordinary income under AFS but market value 
changes are recognized only to the extent of permanent losses.  With the equity method, the acquirer recognizes its 
proportionate share of the net income (or loss) of the target.  In contrast, with consolidated accounting, the acquirer 
and target are treated as a single entity.  Thus, the consolidated balance sheet reflects each of the target’s asset and 
liabilities, except to the extent these are due to or due from another part of the group that is also included in the 
consolidated statements (hence, loans from the parent would cancel out in consolidation).  Similarly, the 
consolidated income statement would reflect the target’s net income with intra-group transactions canceling out in 
consolidation and with a deduction for income attributable to the target’s noncontrolling shareholders. 
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already exercised control before a deal. This affects 103 deals. Further, we exclude deals that 
involve failing targets from the sample.16 Whenever the price the acquirer pays values the equity 
of the target at less than its book value, we examine the press coverage surrounding a deal to 
gauge if the target was a failing bank. We omit 11 deals that we classify as involving failed 
targets 
Where a bidder engages in multiple acquisitions involving the same target bank within 
the same fiscal year, we treat these transactions as a single deal. This affects 12 deals which are 
consolidated into six deals (net loss of six deals).17 As a final step, we require that data for the 
dependent variables (capitalization, liquidity, and performance) are available for both acquiring 
and target banks in t-1 in order to estimate measures of relatedness between the merging firms as 
explained in Section 3.18 
                                                
16 Failed banks are excluded for three reasons:  (a) the acquirer of a failed bank typically receives some form of 
government assistance usually in the form of impaired asset protection schemes that distort profitability and 
capitalization ratios; (b) even with that assistance, the acquiring bank is also often subject to substantial regulatory 
pressure to help the government by acquiring the target, and (c) the target has little or no say with regards to the 
acquisition  Therefore, acquisitions involving failed targets have substantially different risk and profitability 
implications than the other mergers. 
17 For consolidated deals, the deal-specific variables “percentage acquired” and “deal size” are the sum of the 
component deals.  
18 Our sampling strategy retains deals where bidders engage in more than a single deal during our examination 
period of up to two years after the completion of a deal. This treatment of repeat acquisitions is consistent with the 
literature. Similar to us, Ibañez and Altunbas (2004), Campa and Hernando (2006), Beccalli and Frantz (2009), 
Vander Vennet (1996), and Diaz et al. (2004) make no adjustments regarding multiple deals. 
23 
Our final sample contains 103 acquiring banks and 84 target institutions.  We have fewer 
target institutions because many of them stopped reporting financial information when they were 
merged into the acquirer. We verified that our sample selection procedure does not suffer from a 
bias (e.g. when targets which were fully absorbed differ substantially from targets which were 
not absorbed).19 We present an overview of the full sample of targets and acquirers per country 
and year in Table 1.  
4.2  Descriptive analysis of targets and acquirers in EU M&As  
Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses are provided in Tables 2-4. Table 2 
compares targets and acquirers in the year before the deal was completed. Table 3 analyzes 
changes in the same performance ratios over the time period -1 to +2 years relative to the 
completion year of a deal in order to “isolate” the financial impact of each particular M&A.  
Merger-related changes are presented both in absolute (Panel A) and in industry-adjusted form 
(i.e. relative to the median values of the banks’ market; Panel B). Industry-adjusted indicators of 
the safety and soundness of banks are of particular significance for bank supervisors, because 
these show changes in key indicators relative to the market.20 Finally, Table 4 presents the 
summary statistics of the variables included in the regression.  
                                                
19 We tested if the financial and deal data vary by whether the target has subsequently been absorbed by the 
acquiring bank. We perform t-tests to assess whether the mean values of these two groups differ from the safety and 
soundess variables we analyze in this paper. We do not find any of our safety and soundness variables are 
statistically different at customary levels of significance. 
20 In unreported tests, we examine how acquirer and target banks differ from the industry benchmark (i.e. median 
industry values) in the key safety and soundness indicators we investigate in this study. The results of t-tests show 
that both acquirers and targets have lower equity to assets ratios (as well as lower holdings of Tier 1 and total capital 
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 The comparison of targets and acquirer’s in Table 2 shows that targets had higher 
absolute capital ratios pre-merger than acquirers.  Targets have significantly higher absolute 
values for all three capital ratios in Panel A and higher industry-adjusted values for all but the 
risk weighted capital ratio (Panel B).  The regression analysis in this paper focuses on the capital 
to total asset ratio (capasset) because the other two measures (tier 1 capital to risk weighted 
assets [t1rwa] and total capital to risk weighted assets [totalrwa]) are available for far fewer 
targets and are subject to regulatory differences on the assessment of risk weighted assets. 
Further, the liquid funds ratios (liquid) and return on assets (ROA) are not statistically 
significantly different from each other in either absolute or industry adjusted terms. Further, 
acquirers are also less reliant on net interest income (interest) and thus boast a business model 
with a wider range of income sources than target banks.  
 Merger related changes in capital, liquidity, earnings and reliance on net interest income 
are shown in Table 3.  The results of Panel A provide evidence of no statistically significant 
impact of the M&A on the acquirer´s capital, liquidity or earnings in absolute terms.  While the 
industry adjusted ratios show a statistically significant deterioration of the acquirers´ profitability 
immediately after the merger (dROA).  Panel B shows an increase in the target’s capital of 
approximately 0.20% (both in absolute and industry adjusted terms). This is consistent with 
supervisors requiring acquirers of undercapitalized banks to raise the target’s capital ratio.  No 
other change in the target financial ratios is statistically significant.    
                                                                                                                                                       
relative to total assets) and lower liquidity ratios relative to their respective industry benchmarks. In the case of 
acquirers, these differences are larger than for targets for each of these variables. Further, acquirers outperform the 
markets in terms of ROA, while the pre-merger performance of target banks is statistically indistinguishable from 
the industry benchmark.  
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Table 4 provides selected summary statistics for our sample of acquiring (Panel A) and 
target banks (Panel B).  The mean values of the cross-border binary variable, cb, indicates that 
about 40 percent of the observations consist of cross-border transactions.  The target’s assets 
averaged approximately 23-30 percent of that of the acquirer (relsize). The mean values of the 
toe hold variable toe indicates that the acquirer had a previous ownership interest in 
approximately 15-18 percent of the observations. 
5. Model estimation 
5.1 Acquirer model results  
 Table 5 presents the empirical results of our estimations based on the model for acquirer 
changes in capitalization with the first two columns of Table 5 give results of estimating the 
absolute change in leverage whereas the second two columns give the estimation results where 
the dependent variable is measured relative to its home country industry.  Columns 1 and 3 
provide estimation of a base model with only the lagged adjustment (mean reversion) and the 
two relatedness variables and gdp growth (gdpgrwth).  This provides a baseline to determine the 
explanatory power of a simple model.  Columns 2 and 4 then provide estimates of the complete 
model.  
The coefficient on lagged acquirer leverage is consistent with significant mean reversion 
of as much as 15 to 34 percent.  As predicted, the interaction of toehold ownership (toe) and 
relative leverage (relatlev) is negative.   
The coefficient on the binary variable for cross-border mergers is significantly negative 
for both absolute and industry-adjusted values.  This provides some evidence consistent with 
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Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012) that cross-border mergers are associated with greater risk to the 
safety net after controlling for other factors.      
The coefficient on deposit insurance, di, is significantly negative in the absolute value but 
its interaction with cross-border is significantly positive.  The negative coefficient on di is at 
odds with our initial expectation that stricter deposit insurance environments mitigate moral 
hazard type behavior by banks. Instead, the negative coefficient is consistent with explanations 
that better funded deposit insurance schemes give an incentive to be less capitalized post merger 
at least to the extent that a scheme implies a mutualisation of costs.  Accordingly, better funded 
di schemes may provide incentives for banks to engage in moral hazard. The positive coefficient 
on the interaction term suggests that capital fell less if the acquirer’s di takes a larger value than 
the target’s di.  This result seems to qualify our previous interpretation of the negative coefficient 
of cb regarding the potential larger risk to the safety net. 
The estimation results for the acquirer’s earning performance are in Table 6.  The 
coefficient on prior performance ranges from 0.57 to 0.79, which is consistent with very 
substantial mean reversion.  Alternatively, the high value of this coefficient could be due to  a 
reversal of actions taken by the acquirer to boost its reported earnings prior to the merger in an 
effort to impress the supervisors and investors.  The interaction term on cross-border mergers is 
negative, which is consistent with greater difficulties in Table 7 reports the results for changes in 
the acquirer’s liquidity. integrating cross border deals but not with the acquiring group using the 
cross-border deal to invest in higher return/higher risk assets as implied by safety net 
exploitation.   The coefficient on regulatory strength (regul_strength) is significantly positive in 
the industry-adjusted equation.  The coefficients on the interactions of cross-border with 
regulatory strength and deposit insurance are all significantly positive.  One interpretation is that 
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acquirers benefit from the reputation of their home country supervisor when it is tougher than the 
host country supervisor.  
The coefficient on hhi is significantly negative in the industry adjusted equation but 
insignificant in absolute terms. 
Table 7 reports the results for changes in the acquirer’s liquidity.  The coefficients on 
lagged liquidity are also consistent with mean reversion.  All of the coefficients on lagged 
liquidity are significantly greater than zero, but none are significantly different from one.  This 
could reflect some combination of:  (a) some acquirers taking measures to temporarily boost 
their premerger liquidity for precautionary purposes including payment of the acquirers´ shares 
in cash, and (b) those banks that were reporting weak premerger performance needing to 
demonstrate to their supervisors prior to the merger that they were on a positive trend to get the 
deal approved.  The coefficient on the relatedness variable (difference between acquirer and 
target in t-1) is approximately -1.0 but it is not measured very precisely.  The interaction term of 
the relatedness variable and toehold is approximately 0.4 and is generally significant.  The 
combination of these findings suggests that acquirers do not have to build up as much liquidity 
for the acquisition if they already had a toehold in the target.  As shown in Hernando, Nieto and 
Wall (2009) staggered shareholding acquisitions of banks is common in the EU.21  
Regulatory strength has a negative coefficient in absolute terms contrary to predictions, 
but the coefficient is insignificant in industry adjusted terms, which could be explained by the 
reduced need for liquidity for precautionary purposes in a stricter prudential regulatory 
environment.  Both interactions with cb (regulatory strength and deposit insurance) are 
                                                
21 Hernando, Nieto and Wall (2009) show that, in their sample, once an acquirer has more than 20% it is highly 
likely to the acquirer would buy at least 50% of the target during their study period. 
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significantly positive.22  Lastly, our results show a statistically significant correlation between the 
absolute change in liquidity and GDP growth in the period immediately after the merger.    
Overall, these results most strongly suggest that our measures of acquirers’ financial 
condition show signs consistent with moderate to strong mean reversion.  This could reflect 
some combination of:  (i) some acquirers taking measures to temporarily boost their premerger 
performance in order to improve their bargaining position, and (ii) those banks that were 
reporting weak premerger performance needed to demonstrate to their supervisors prior to the 
merger that they were on a positive trend to get the deal approved.23 The next strongest finding is 
that acquirer’s showed more improvement in their post-merger earnings performance if their 
supervisor and deposit insurance funding system were stronger than that of the target.  This result 
is consistent with the group benefiting from importing the acquirer’s stronger supervision into 
the target (such as through a lower cost of funds).  If so, we should observe similar results in the 
model estimating post-merger changes in target earnings performance.  An alternative is that 
stricter home country supervision may be more effective in preventing acquirers from engaging 
in takeovers that would result in a weak post-merger group. 
                                                
22 The estimated effects for the regulatory variables in the case of cross-border deals are not significantly different 
from zero. In unreported tests, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the regulatory 
strength index and the corresponding interaction term is zero. 
23 In unreported tests, we seek to verify whether acquirers temporarily boosted their financial condition pre-merger 
before reverting to their pre-merger levels shortly afterwards. We indeed find negative correlations (r) for changes 
between years -3 and -1 and +1 and +3 in leverage (r = -0.15), ROA (r = -0.23) and liquidity (r = -0.44, significantly 
different from zero at 5%). However, with the exception of liquidity, the correlations remain modest in magnitude. 
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5.2 Target model results 
 The results with the target variables are presented in Tables 8-10.  The results for target 
capitalization are not very informative about the cross-sectional distribution of leverage changes.  
The coefficients on lagged leverage are negative and large in absolute magnitude, larger than 
those for the acquirer. The only significant coefficients are the coefficients on deposit insurance, 
which is consistent with expectations.  However, the f-tests for the joint significance of the 
coefficients fail to reject the hypothesis that they are all equal to zero in all equations. 
 The results for target earnings performance are presented in Table 9.  Again the 
coefficients on lagged performance are moderately large but very imprecisely measured; none of 
them are statistically significant.  However, the coefficients on relative earnings (acquirer roa 
minus target roa) are consistently significant and economically large in industry adjusted terms 
(only in the first equation in absolute terms).  Targets move approximately 50 to 60 percent of 
the way towards the roa levels of their acquirer.  The coefficients on hhi are consistently 
negative suggesting that profits dip in the period immediately after the merger either because 
management disruption results in a temporary loss of economic rents or because deliberately 
higher asset growth at the expense of profitability allows to better exploit concentrated markets.   
 Greater regulatory strength and (in the industry adjusted equation) tougher deposit 
insurance are associated with significantly higher target profits.  One interpretation of this is that 
stronger supervisors encourage less profitable banks to sell themselves to stronger banks.  This 
hypothesis receives some support from the low profitability of some of the targets in our sample.  
The mean roa  at t-1 for bottom quartile of targets in our sample as measured by roa, is -0.48 
percent and these banks show an increase in ROA of 0.605 p.p. from t-1 to t+2.  However, the 
average values of regulatory strength and deposit insurance indexes for target banks in the 
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bottom quartile are not significantly different from the average of all targets.  None of the 
interactions with cross-border are statistically significant.  These findings fail to support the 
hypothesis that the target’s performance benefits from the importing of the stricter supervision of 
its new parent’s supervisor.   
 The results for liquidity reported in Table 10 show large negative coefficients on lagged 
liquidity which is consistent with strong mean reversion for target liquidity.    If the acquirer had 
a toe hold in the target, the absolute measure of liquidity tended to decrease.  Both stricter a 
target deposit insurance regime and acquirer deposit regimes that are stricter than the targets are 
associated with larger industry adjusted changes in liquidity. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
  Bank M&As both within and among EU countries gathered considerable momentum with 
the introduction of the Euro. In spite of this, there is a dearth of studies that focus on the short 
term impact of M&As on the capitalization, earnings and liquidity of both targets and acquirers.  
This paper attempts to bridge that gap and add another relevant dimension, which is the impact 
of the prudential regulatory stance and the strength of deposit insurance schemes on bank merger 
outcomes.  We analyze a sample of European bank mergers (EU) which were completed 
between 1997 and 2007.  Our sample contains accounting data for both  EU acquiring and target 
banks over the examination period of -1 to +2 years around the completion date of a deal in order 
to isolate the impact of the M&A.   
 In terms of policy implications, we find that M&A activity has a generally insignificant 
impact on our safety and soundness indicators, with the biggest exception being an increase in 
the leverage ratio (capital to assets ratio) for targets (significant at the 10 percent level).  
However, looking cross-sectionally, we frequently find that the acquirer and to a lesser extent the 
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target become financially stronger if the acquirer’s home country supervision is stronger than 
that of the targets.  One hypothesis is that this is a result of the target importing the reputational 
benefits associated with the stricter regime imposed by the acquirer’s consolidating supervisor.  
This hypothesis is not supported by evidence that the target’s profitability is significantly 
positively correlated with stricter supervision of the acquirer relative to the target.  An alternative 
hypothesis that is consistent with both findings is that relatively stricter supervision of the 
acquirer is more likely to prevent acquirers from making bad takeovers.  Thus, while our 
evidence does not support the case that M&A is generally good or bad for bank safety and 
soundness; it does support the case that strict consolidating supervisors results in better 
takeovers. 
 Our paper also has methodological implications for the future analysis of bank M&A:  
the empirical design should account for the possibility of mean reversion to a greater extent.  We 
find evidence consistent with mean reversion for the acquirer that should be taken into account in 
the research design.  Additionally, we also find evidence consistent with significant mean 
reversion in the target, albeit in many cases our measures are not very precise.   
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Table 1 Sample Description 
 Acquirer  Target 
Country No. %  No. % 
Panel A: Countries 
      
Austria 7 (6.8)  2 (2.38) 
Belgium 4 (3.88)  3 (3.57) 
Czech Republic    3 (3.57) 
Denmark 3 (2.91)  2 (2.38) 
Estonia    1 (1.19) 
Finland    1 (1.19) 
France 17 (16.5)  7 (8.33) 
Germany 11 (10.68)  9 (10.71) 
Greece 4 (3.88)  3 (3.57) 
Ireland 1 (0.97)  1 (1.19) 
Italy 33 (32.04)  28 (33.33) 
Latvia    1 (1.19) 
Lithuania    2 (2.38) 
Luxembourg 2 (1.94)    
Malta    1 (1.19) 
Poland 1 (0.97)  5 (5.95) 
Portugal 3 (2.91)    
Slovak Rep    3 (3.57) 
Slovenia 1 (0.97)  2 (2.38) 
Spain 5 (4.85)  6 (7.14) 
Sweden 5 (4.85)    
United Kingdom 6 (5.83)  4 (4.76) 
      
Total 103 (100.00)  84 (100.00) 
      
Panel B: Merger Completion Years 
      
1997 9 (8.74)  7 (8.33) 
1998 8 (7.77)  8 (9.52) 
1999 19 (18.45)  13 (15.48) 
2000 12 (11.65)  12 (14.29) 
2001 12 (11.65)  9 (10.71) 
2002 7 (6.8)  5 (5.95) 
2003 9 (8.74)  7 (8.33) 
2004 10 (9.71)  9 (10.71) 
2005 6 (5.83)  5 (5.95) 
2006 7 (6.8)  6 (7.14) 
2007 4 (3.88)  3 (3.57) 
      
Total 103 (100.00)  84 (100.00) 
      
This table shows the sample composition. Years refer to the year of merger completion as supplied by Thomson Financial. 
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Table 2 Target and Bidding Bank Characteristics Pre-M&A 
 N  Acquirer  Target 
Difference 
Acquirer-Target  t-Stat  p-Value 
Panel A: Absolute Values 
       
capasset 79 4.935 7.614 -2.680 (-4.69)*** 0.00 
t1rwa  38 8.695 11.717 -3.022 (-2.51)** 0.02 
totalrwa  47 10.874 13.481 -2.607 (-2.69)*** 0.01 
liquid  70 22.846 25.354 -2.508 (-0.89) 0.38 
roa 79 0.529 0.638 -0.109 (-0.93) 0.36 
interest  79 57.400 67.292 -9.892 (-4.71)*** 0.00 
       
Panel B: Industry-adjusted Values 
       
capasset 79 -3.374 -1.418 -1.956 (-3.39)*** 0.00 
t1rwa  38 -4.103 -1.901 -2.202 (-1.93)* 0.06 
totalrwa  46 -3.849 -2.406 -1.443 (-1.41) 0.17 
liquid  70 -5.955 -8.210 2.255 (0.67) 0.51 
roa 79 -0.085 -0.098 0.013 (0.12) 0.90 
interest  79 -40.866 -30.483 -10.382 (-3.60)*** 0.00 
       
This table reports target and bidding bank characteristics before M&A. Capasset is the equity to assets 
ratio, t1rwa is the tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio and totalrwa is total regulatory capital to 
risk-weighted assets. Roa is return on assets and interest is net interest income over total operating 
income. All values refer to the last fiscal year before the acquisition completion. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 3 Merger-related changes for targets and acquirers  
 Absolute Differences   Industry-Adjusted Differences 
 N change t-Stat p-value   N change t-Stat p-value 
Panel A: Acquiring Banks 
           
dcapasset 103 0.142 1.01 0.32   103 -0.260 -1.24 0.22 
dt1rwa  85 -0.342 -1.39 0.17   85 -0.048 -0.16 0.87 
dtotalrwa  91 -0.049 -0.21 0.84   91 0.325 1.16 0.25 
dliquid  93 -0.631 -0.19 0.85   93 3.529 1.04 0.30 
droa 103 -0.054 -1.43 0.16   103 -0.068 -1.65* 0.10 
dinterest  103 -10.414 -0.82 0.41   103 -9.406 -0.74 0.46 
           
Panel B: Target Banks 
           
dcapasset 84 1.189 1.60* 0.09   84 1.225 1.66* 0.10 
dt1rwa  47 -0.055 -0.05 0.96   47 0.409 0.38 0.71 
dtotalrwa  56 0.217 0.25 0.80   55 0.706 0.77 0.44 
dliquid  81 -1.742 -0.67 0.50   81 3.033 1.15 0.25 
droa 84 -0.003 -0.02 0.98   84 0.031 0.27 0.79 
dinterest  84 -4.518 -1.13 0.26   84 -2.584 -0.62 0.54 
           
           
This table reports differences in safety and soundness variables which are due to M&A. Differences are 
computed as values in +2 year minus values in -1 year relative to the merger completion year. Industry-
adjusted values are expressed based on median values of banks chartered in the same country. Capasset is the 
equity to assets ratio, t1rwa is the tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio and totalrwa is total regulatory 
capital to risk-weighted assets, liquid are liquid assets over customer and short-term deposits. Roa is return on 
assets and interest is net interest income over total operating income. All values refer to the last fiscal year 
before the acquisition completion. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%   
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Table 4 Summary Statistics 
 N Mean SD p50 p25 p75 
Panel A: Acquiring Banks 
       
dcapasset 103 0.142 1.428 0.105 -0.433 0.766 
dliquid 93 -0.631 31.983 -3.620 -13.970 1.930 
droa 103 -0.054 0.388 -0.060 -0.280 0.140 
levert-1 103 5.337 2.738 4.374 3.380 6.487 
liquid t-1 93 23.978 14.712 21.750 14.830 28.810 
roa t-1 103 0.600 0.424 0.520 0.330 0.810 
regul_strength 101 5.525 1.906 5.000 4.000 6.000 
di 103 1.262 0.610 1.000 1.000 2.000 
hhi 103 0.084 0.063 0.060 0.044 0.105 
gdpgrwth 103 2.347 1.585 1.925 1.343 3.364 
cb 103 0.398 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 
relsize 103 0.229 0.406 0.040 0.013 0.229 
toe 103 0.155 0.364 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Panel B: Target Banks 
       
dcapasset 84 1.189 6.814 -0.082 -1.536 1.853 
dliquid 81 -1.742 23.278 -2.780 -11.410 8.040 
droa 84 -0.003 1.130 -0.005 -0.450 0.405 
capasset t-1 84 7.629 5.137 6.978 4.663 9.294 
liquid t-1 83 26.470 20.907 22.070 12.190 36.020 
roa t-1 84 0.637 1.026 0.545 0.230 0.970 
regul_strength 78 5.897 1.777 5.000 5.000 7.000 
di 81 1.136 0.518 1.000 1.000 1.000 
hhi 84 0.102 0.096 0.075 0.044 0.126 
gdpgrwth 84 2.719 1.545 2.665 1.439 3.840 
cb 84 0.417 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
relsize 84 0.295 1.036 0.039 0.012 0.206 
toe 84 0.179 0.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
This table reports summary statistics. The prefix d denotes differences in variables 
which are computed as values in +2 year minus values in -1 year relative to the 
merger completion year. Capasset is the equity to assets ratio, t1rwa is the tier 1 
capital to risk-weighted assets ratio and totalrwa is total regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets, liquid are liquid assets over customer and short-term deposits. Roa 
is return on assets and interest is net interest income over total operating income, 
regul_stregnth is the an index of regulatory strength, di an index of deposit 
insurance regime, gdpgwrth is real GDP growth, cb is a dummy which is one if the 
deal is a cross-border deal (and zero otherwise), relsize are target assets divided by 
acquiring bank assets and toe is a binary variable which is one if the acquirer owns 
some equity in the target before the focal acquisition (and zero otherwise). 
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Table 5 Regressions on Merger-related changes in Acquirer Capitalization 
 Absolute Values  Industry-adjusted Values 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
levert-1 -0.142*** -0.260***  -0.345*** -0.304*** 
 (2.71) (3.38)  (3.85) (3.28) 
relatlever 0.067 0.015  0.111 0.115 
 (1.58) (0.16)  (0.94) (0.97) 
toe*relatlever -0.078*** -0.087**  -0.095*** -0.129*** 
 (3.67) (2.40)  (3.38) (4.33) 
relsize  0.342   -0.129 
  (0.68)   (0.27) 
toe  -0.075   1.044** 
  (0.19)   (2.02) 
cb  -0.604**   -0.991** 
  (2.17)   (2.18) 
regul_strength  -0.175   0.310 
  (0.89)   (1.29) 
di  -1.153**   -0.394 
  (2.38)   (0.85) 
cb*regul  0.014   -0.225 
  (0.10)   (1.10) 
cb*di  0.631*   0.041 
  (1.73)   (0.08) 
hhi  -0.842   -5.501 
  (0.27)   (1.44) 
gdpgrwth -0.088 -0.054  -0.096 -0.122 
 (1.41) (0.55)  (0.84) (0.85) 
      
Constant 0.925*** 3.970**  -1.327*** -1.815 
 (3.08) (2.41)  (2.86) (1.01) 
Observations 103 91  103 91 
Adj. R-squared 0.184 0.244  0.292 0.339 
F-Stat 5.19 2.93  4.93 4.17 
      
This table reports regression results. The dependent variable is merger-related change in return on 
acquirer capitalization from -1 to +2 years relative to the merger completion year. The prefix relat denotes 
similarities between acquirer and acquirer measured as acquirer values minus target values in one fiscal 
year before the acquisition. Bank controls refer to the acquiring bank. Capasset is the equity to assets 
ratio, t1rwa is the tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio and totalrwa is total regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets, liquid are liquid assets over customer and short-term deposits. Roa is return on assets and 
interest is net interest income over total operating income. Country controls refer to the acquirer country 
in the year of the acquisition completion. regul_stregnth is the an index of regulatory strength, di an index 
of deposit insurance regime, gdpgwrth is real GDP growth, cb is a dummy which is one if the deal is a 
cross-border deal (and zero otherwise), relsize are target assets divided by acquiring bank assets and toe is 
a binary variable which is one if the acquirer owns some equity in the target before the focal acquisition 
(and zero otherwise). Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%	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Table 6 Regressions on Merger-related changes in Acquirer Performance 
 Absolute Values  Industry-adjusted Values 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
roat-1 -0.570*** -0.654***  -0.760*** -0.786*** 
 (3.90) (3.64)  (6.08) (5.17) 
relatroa 0.002 -0.096  -0.064 -0.201** 
 (0.03) (1.31)  (1.01) (2.49) 
toe*relatroa 0.010 0.027  0.015 0.042 
 (0.23) (0.41)  (0.34) (0.60) 
relsize  0.062   0.063 
  (0.77)   (1.06) 
toe  -0.073   -0.051 
  (0.67)   (0.52) 
cb  -0.153*   -0.093 
  (1.92)   (1.54) 
regul_strength  0.010   0.069** 
  (0.29)   (2.07) 
di  -0.126   -0.024 
  (0.97)   (0.21) 
cb*regul  0.081**   0.077** 
  (2.04)   (2.16) 
cb*di  0.295**   0.326** 
  (2.38)   (2.49) 
hhi  0.196   -1.689* 
  (0.42)   (1.91) 
gdpgrwth 0.028 0.026  0.025 0.020 
 (0.99) (0.84)  (1.35) (0.73) 
      
Constant 0.220*** 0.373  -0.160*** -0.394 
 (2.64) (1.08)  (3.13) (1.49) 
Observations 102 90  102 90 
Adj. R-squared 0.264 0.297  0.419 0.444 
F-Stat 8.25 4.37  16.61 14.85 
      
This table reports regression results. The dependent variable are merger-related changes in acquirer return on 
equity from -1 to +2 years relative to the merger completion year. The prefix relat denotes similarities between 
acquirer and target measured as acquirer values minus target values in one fiscal year before the acquisition. 
Bank controls refer to the acquiring bank. Capasset is the equity to assets ratio, t1rwa is the tier 1 capital to risk-
weighted assets ratio and totalrwa is total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, liquid are liquid assets over 
customer and short-term deposits. Roa is return on assets and interest is net interest income over total operating 
income. Country controls refer to the acquirer country in the year of the acquisition completion. regul_stregnth is 
the an index of regulatory strength, di an index of deposit insurance regime, gdpgwrth is real GDP growth, cb is 
a dummy which is one if the deal is a cross-border deal (and zero otherwise), relsize are target assets divided by 
acquiring bank assets and toe is a binary variable which is one if the acquirer owns some equity in the target 
before the focal acquisition (and zero otherwise). Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7 Regressions on Merger-related changes in Acquirer Liquidity 
 Absolute Values  Industry-adjusted Values 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
liquidt-1 -1.290*** -1.221***  -0.625*** -0.831*** 
 (3.70) (3.63)  (3.43) (3.35) 
relatliquid -0.929 -1.009  -0.877 -1.072 
 (1.40) (1.64)  (1.24) (1.62) 
toe*relatliquid 0.281*** 0.368***  0.122 0.307** 
 (2.71) (3.03)  (1.20) (2.58) 
relsize  -3.278   -1.038 
  (0.92)   (0.23) 
toe  -0.680   -0.608 
  (0.06)   (0.05) 
cb  4.613   9.313 
  (0.65)   (1.12) 
regul_strength  -5.199**   -3.066 
  (2.03)   (1.46) 
di  -5.137   9.162 
  (0.56)   (0.99) 
cb*regul  7.605*   6.120 
  (1.85)   (1.44) 
cb*di  21.632*   15.644 
  (1.68)   (1.16) 
hhi  -46.087   15.216 
  (1.02)   (0.27) 
gdpgrwth 2.182 2.868*  0.326 1.862 
 (1.58) (1.80)  (0.35) (1.10) 
      
Constant 25.873*** 60.521**  -0.531 -4.302 
 (2.69) (2.24)  (0.13) (0.21) 
Observations 92 80  92 80 
Adj. R-squared 0.245 0.275  0.092 0.188 
F-Stat 3.58 1.54  3.16 1.45 
      
This table reports regression results. The dependent variable are merger-related changes in acquirer liquid assets 
to customer and short-tern funding from -1 to +2 years relative to the merger completion year. The prefix relat 
denotes similarities between acquirer and target measured as acquirer values minus target values in one fiscal 
year before the acquisition. Bank controls refer to the acquiring bank. Capasset is the equity to assets ratio, t1rwa 
is the tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio and totalrwa is total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, 
liquid are liquid assets over customer and short-term deposits. Roa is return on assets and interest is net interest 
income over total operating income. Country controls refer to the acquirer country in the year of the acquisition 
completion. regul_stregnth is the an index of regulatory strength, di an index of deposit insurance regime, 
gdpgwrth is real GDP growth, cb is a dummy which is one if the deal is a cross-border deal (and zero otherwise), 
relsize are target assets divided by acquiring bank assets and toe is a binary variable which is one if the acquirer 
owns some equity in the target before the focal acquisition (and zero otherwise). Heteroskedasticity robust t 
statistics in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%	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Table 8 Regressions on Merger-related changes in Target Capitalization 
 Absolute Values  Industry-adjusted Values 
 (1) (3)  (4) (6) 
      
capassett-1 -0.535 -0.294  -0.311 -0.407 
 (1.35) (0.77)  (1.07) (1.04) 
relatlever -0.329 -0.019  -0.122 -0.099 
 (0.90) (0.06)  (0.55) (0.33) 
toe *relatlever 0.227 -0.087  0.027 -0.128 
 (1.26) (0.31)  (0.13) (0.43) 
relsize  -0.535   -0.563 
  (1.26)   (1.47) 
toe  -4.205   -4.328 
  (1.27)   (1.48) 
cb  -1.203   -0.556 
  (0.70)   (0.35) 
regul_strength  0.068   0.445 
  (0.13)   (0.70) 
di  5.448*   6.641 
  (1.70)   (1.58) 
cb*regul  0.115   0.427 
  (0.18)   (0.66) 
cb*di  2.679   3.299 
  (1.15)   (1.27) 
hhi  -6.687   -9.678 
  (0.67)   (1.07) 
gdpgrwth -0.170 0.525  -0.149 0.670 
 (0.46) (0.70)  (0.38) (0.89) 
      
Constant 4.973* -3.308  0.860 -10.190 
 (1.67) (0.77)  (0.50) (1.25) 
Observations 84 74  84 74 
Adj. R-squared 0.008 0.012  -0.021 0.002 
F-Stat 1.51 1.37  1.48 1.02 
This table reports regression results. The dependent variable is merger-related change in target equity to 
total assets ratio from -1 to +2 years relative to the merger completion year. The prefix relat denotes 
similarities between acquirer and target measured as acquirer values minus target values in one fiscal year 
before the acquisition. Bank controls refer to the acquiring bank. Capasset is the equity to assets ratio, 
t1rwa is the tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio and totalrwa is total regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets, liquid are liquid assets over customer and short-term deposits. Roa is return on assets and 
interest is net interest income over total operating income. Country controls refer to the target country in 
the year of the acquisition completion. regul_stregnth is the an index of regulatory strength, di an index of 
deposit insurance regime, gdpgwrth is real GDP growth, cb is a dummy which is one if the deal is a cross-
border deal (and zero otherwise), relsize are target assets divided by acquiring bank assets and toe is a 
binary variable which is one if the acquirer owns some equity in the target before the focal acquisition 
(and zero otherwise).	  Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%	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 Table 9 Regressions on Merger-related changes in Target Performance 
 Absolute Values  Industry-adjusted Values 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
roat-1 -0.272 -0.173  -0.303 -0.119 
 (0.90) (0.38)  (1.39) (0.32) 
relatroa 0.495* 0.618  0.448** 0.578* 
 (1.74) (1.45)  (2.05) (1.72) 
toe *relatroa -0.000 0.046  -0.190 -0.090 
 (0.00) (0.22)  (1.13) (0.38) 
relsize  -0.026   -0.013 
  (0.78)   (0.39) 
toe  -0.182   -0.116 
  (0.64)   (0.41) 
cb  -0.054   0.068 
  (0.19)   (0.28) 
regul_strength  0.254**   0.235** 
  (2.28)   (2.10) 
di  0.653   0.539* 
  (1.62)   (1.71) 
cb*regul  0.189   0.138 
  (0.54)   (0.43) 
cb*di  0.165   0.133 
  (1.50)   (1.41) 
hhi  -4.308*   -5.349** 
  (1.83)   (2.56) 
gdpgrwth -0.035 -0.067  -0.048 -0.066 
 (0.54) (0.89)  (0.89) (1.02) 
      
Constant 0.317** -1.475  0.169 -1.324* 
 (2.54) (1.63)  (1.14) (1.91) 
Observations 84 74  84 74 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.466 0.441  0.410 0.338 
F-Stat 21.75 9.06  17.32 4.91 
      
This table reports regression results. The dependent variable is merger-related change in target return on 
equity from -1 to +2 years relative to the merger completion year. The prefix relat denotes similarities 
between acquirer and target measured as acquirer values minus target values in one fiscal year before the 
acquisition. Bank controls refer to the acquiring bank. Capasset is the equity to assets ratio, t1rwa is the 
tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio and totalrwa is total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, 
liquid are liquid assets over customer and short-term deposits. Roa is return on assets and interest is net 
interest income over total operating income. Country controls refer to the target country in the year of the 
acquisition completion. regul_stregnth is the an index of regulatory strength, di an index of deposit 
insurance regime, gdpgwrth is real GDP growth, cb is a dummy which is one if the deal is a cross-border 
deal (and zero otherwise), relsize are target assets divided by acquiring bank assets and toe is a binary 
variable which is one if the acquirer owns some equity in the target before the focal acquisition (and zero 
otherwise).	  Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%	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Table 10 Regressions on Merger-related changes in Target Liquidity 
 Absolute Values  Industry-adjusted Values 
 (1) (3)  (4) (6) 
      
liquidt-1 -0.552*** -0.504**  -0.288** -0.396** 
 (3.62) (2.49)  (2.03) (2.59) 
relatliquid -0.097 -0.011  0.043 0.032 
 (0.53) (0.04)  (0.30) (0.18) 
toe *relatliquid 0.065 -0.074  0.191 0.036 
 (0.23) (0.28)  (0.62) (0.12) 
relsize  0.500   1.790 
  (0.36)   (1.42) 
toe  -11.932*   -11.266 
  (1.78)   (1.39) 
cb  -5.606   -8.650 
  (0.93)   (1.48) 
regul_strength  -0.977   -0.613 
  (0.33)   (0.19) 
di  18.003   20.374* 
  (1.52)   (1.83) 
cb*regul  -0.299   0.636 
  (0.12)   (0.23) 
cb*di  14.461   19.926** 
  (1.58)   (2.18) 
hhi  42.557   62.284 
  (0.55)   (0.72) 
gdpgrwth -0.065 1.904  -0.695 1.015 
 (0.05) (1.20)  (0.46) (0.55) 
      
Constant 12.318 -13.102  2.453 -28.494 
 (1.63) (0.48)  (0.39) (1.19) 
Observations 73 63  73 63 
Adj. R-squared 0.119 0.145  0.067 0.087 
F-Stat 4.28 4.95  2.70 5.11 
      
This table reports regression results. The dependent variable is merger-related change in target liquid 
assets to customer and short-tern funding from -1 to +2 years relative to the merger completion year. The 
prefix relat denotes similarities between acquirer and target measured as acquirer values minus target 
values in one fiscal year before the acquisition. Bank controls refer to the acquiring bank. Capasset is the 
equity to assets ratio, t1rwa is the tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio and totalrwa is total regulatory 
capital to risk-weighted assets, liquid are liquid assets over customer and short-term deposits. Roa is 
return on assets and interest is net interest income over total operating income. Country controls refer to 
the target country in the year of the acquisition completion. regul_stregnth is the an index of regulatory 
strength, di an index of deposit insurance regime, gdpgwrth is real GDP growth, cb is a dummy which is 
one if the deal is a cross-border deal (and zero otherwise), relsize are target assets divided by acquiring 
bank assets and toe is a binary variable which is one if the acquirer owns some equity in the target before 
the focal acquisition (and zero otherwise).	  Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%	  
 
